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[L. A. No. 23564. In Bank. Nov. 25, 1955.] 
DE LUZ HOMES, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, .... 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Appellant. 
[L. A. No. 23656. In Bank. Nov. 25, 1955.] 
DE LUZ HOMES, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, .... 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Appellant. 
WIRE MOUNTAIN HOMES, INC. NO.1 (a Corporation), 
Respondent, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Appellant. 
WIRE MOUNTAIN HOMES, INC. NO.2 (a Corporation), 
Respondent, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Appellant. 
[1] Taxation-Assessment-PropeIty Escaping Assessment.-Un-
der Rev. & Tax. Code, § 531, when property is not assessed 
between the first Mondays in March and July for any tax 
year, the assessor is required to assess it when he discovers 
its physical existence, its taxable status, or the fact that it 
has not been assessed. 
[2] Id.-Assessment-Property Escaping Assessment.-Only if a 
delayed assessment were caused by the assessor's negligence 
and would cause substantial injury to the taxpayer might 
such assessment be improper. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 161; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 734-
McK. Dig. References: [1 2, 5] Taxation, § 147; [3] Taxation, 
§ 199(1); L 4, 16] Taxation, § 208; [6-8, 14] Taxation, § 183; 
[9, 21-23, 25, 26, 28-31, 34, 35] Taxation, § 191; [10] Taxation, 
§§ 53, 55, 60; [11] Taxation, § 60; [12] Taxation, § 57; [13, 33] 
Taxation, § 189; [15, 17-20, 27] Taxation, § 186; [24, 32] Taxa-
tion, § 187. 
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[3] Id. - Equalization - Proceedings of Local Board - Notice.-
Where a taxpayer appeared before the county board of equali-
zation and requested that a Jl.Ossessory interest in tax exempt 
land, which was not assessed during the regular assessment 
period, be assessed at the figures which the taxpayer supplied, 
but the assessor opposed the petition and the board authorized 
the assessor to enter an assessment as soon as he secured suffi-
cient information, such authorization was properly granted, 
notwithstanding that it was not preceded by five days' notice 
as required by Rev. & Tax. Code, § 1611, since the matter was 
"investigated" within the meaning of such statute when both 
the taxpayer and the assessor appeared before the board and 
argued, respectively, that an immediate assessment should be 
made and that assessment should be delayed, and they may 
not thereafter complain that they did not receive five days' 
notice of the meeting. 
[4] Id.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Board-Review.-
Where the county board of equalization could have concluded 
that the assessor did not have sufficient information to make 
an assessment up to the time of a hearing before the board, 
and where there is no evidence that the board acted arbitrarily 
or abused its discretion in authorizing the assessor to enter 
an assessment as soon as he secured sufficient information, its 
directions to the assessor cannot be set aside. 
[6] Id.-Assessment-Property Escaping Assessment.-Where the 
assessor, who was authorized by the county board of equaliza-
tion to enter an assessment as soon as he secured sufficient 
information, entered his assessment without further notice to 
the taxpayer, and where neither the order of the board nor 
any statute required such notice and the assessment was made 
in accord with the directions of the board, it was validly 
entered on the tax roll. 
[6a,6b] Id.-Assessment-Valuation.-Under Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 401, declaring that all taxable property shall be assessed 
at its "full cash value," the quoted words provide for an 
assessment at the price that property would bring to its 
owner if it were offered for sale on an open market under 
conditions in which neither buyer nor seller could take advan-
tage of the exigencies of the other; such standard of valuation 
is a measure of desirability translated into money amounts, 
and might be called the market value of property for use in 
its present condition. 
[7] Id.-Assessment-Valuation.-All taxable property must be 
assessed at its "full cash value," as prescribed by Rev. &·Tax. 
Code, § 401. (Const., art. XIII, § 1.) 
[6] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 187; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 696. 
) 
) 
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[8] 
[9] ., 
Id.-Assessment--Valuation.-Const., art. XIII, § 1, requires 
not only that all nonexempt property be taxed, but that except 
as otherwise specified all property be assessed by the same 
standard of valuation. 
Id.-Assessment--Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-Since non-
exempt possessory interests in land and improvements, such 
as leasehold estates, are taxable property, they must be 
assessed at "full cash value." 
[10] Id.-Subjects of Taxation-Real Property.-In practice, as-
sessors usually enter the entire value of land and improve-
ments on the tax roll without distinction between possessory 
and reversionary interests, and since this practice results in 
a single amount reflecting both interests on the roll, the 
constitutional mandate that all property be taxed is obeyed. 
[11] Id.-Subjects of Taxation-Real Property-Possessory Inter-
ests.-As between reversioners and possessors payment of the 
tax is a private arrangement, but when the possessory interest 
is taxable and the reversion is exempt, only the possessory 
interest is subject to assessment and taxation. 
[12] Id.-Subjects of Taxation-Real Property-Leaseholds.-
Where there is a lease of land owned by a pnblic body, the 
reversion being exempt from taxation, the usufructuary in-
terest alone is subject to tax in proportion to its value; and 
in the absence of agreement to the contrary, the tax necessarily 
falls on the lessee. 
[13] Id.-Assessment--Valuation-Possessory Interests.-Since a 
possessory interest in land must be assessed in accord with 
the standard of valuation applicable to all other property, 
its estimated value is the price it would bring if offered on an 
open market under conditions in which neither buyer nor seller 
could take advantage of the exigencies of the other, and this 
hypothetical market price is its value though a sale of the 
property has not been made or contemplated. 
[14] Id.-Assessment--Valuation.-The absence of an lI.ctual mar-
ket for a particular t.ype of property does not mean that it 
has no value or that it may escape from the mandate of Const., 
art. XIII. § 1, that all property shall be taxed in proportion 
to its value, but only that the assessor must then use snch 
pertinent factors as replacement costs and analyses for deter-
mining valuation. 
[15] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valuation.-Assessors 
generally estimate value by analyzing market data on sales 
of similar property, replacement costs and income from the 
property, and sinct> no one of these methods alone can be 
used to estimate thc value of all property, the assessor, subject 
to requirements of fairness and uniformity, may exercise his 
discretion in using one or lllOl'e of them. 
) 
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[16] Id.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Board-Review.-
The assessing authority's estimate of the value of specific 
property at a specific time is reviewed by the board of equali-
zation at the taxpayer's request (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 1601-
1615), and the board's decision in regard to specific valuations 
and the methods of valuation employed is equivalent to the 
findings and judgment of a trial court and is reviewable only 
for arbitrariness, abuse of discretion or failure to follow the 
standards prescribed by the Legislature. 
[17] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valuation.-Accord-
ing to the capitalization of income method of valuing prop-
erty from which income may be or is derived, the value of 
the property is the sum of anticipated future installments of 
net income from the property, less an allowance for interest 
and the risk of partial or no receipt; it involves a capitaliza-
tion or discounted valuation of the realized or prospective 
net monetary income derivable by continuous exploitation 
rather than by resale. 
[18] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valuation.-The first 
step in tht: capitalization of income method of valuing property 
is to determine prospective net income and this is done by 
estimating future gross income and deducting therefrom ex-
pected necessary expenses incident to maintenance and opera-
tion of the property, and in instances in which future income 
cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy or is not 
ascribable entirely to the property, prospective net monetary 
income is imputed in an amount equal to a minimum reasonable 
return on estimated market value. 
[19] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valuation.-Since it is 
generally accepted that a person who agrees to receive pay-
ment in the future is entitled to interest both for waiting 
and the risk of partial or no receipt, the second step in the 
capitalization of income method of valuing property is to 
discount each ft.1ture installment of income by a rate of interest 
that takes into account the hazards of the investment and 
the accepted concepts of a "fair return"; and the sum of the 
discounted installments is the present· value of the property. 
[20] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valuation.-The net 
earnings to be capitalized, under the capitalization of income 
method of valuing property, are not those of the present owner 
of the property, but those that would be anticipated by a 
prospective purchaser. 
[21] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-The stand-
ard of "full cash value" (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 401) applies to 
a leasehold interest, and accordingly the assessor must estimate 
the price a leasehold would bring on an open market under 
conditions in which neither buyer nor seller could take advan-
-".' 
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tage of the exigencies of the other, and he must capitalize, 
not the anticipated net earnings of the present lessee, but 
those of a prospective assignee. 
[22] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-To a pros-
pective assignee of a lease, anticipated net earnings equal 
.. expected gross income less necessary expenditures for main-
tenance, operation and taxes; no deduction is made for the 
cost of the lease to the present lessee, i.e., his charges for 
rent and amortization of improvements. 
[23] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-A person 
who has assumed a lease will deduct from his annual income 
statement an aliquot portion of the price he paid to acquire 
the lease and of the cost of improvements that he installed, 
but such practice will not reflect the "full cash value" of 
the property for tax assessment purposes. 
[24] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Deductions.-In determining 
the income to be capitalized to establish value for appraisal 
purposes, no deduction can be made for amortization. 
[26] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-Rent paid 
for a leasehold interest is part of the cost or purchase price 
of the leasehold, and to include a deduction for it is to include 
an item of expense based on the value of the property, and 
it would not only be anomalous to deduct any part of that 
value, the very answer sought, from the income that is to be 
capitalized to obtain that answer, it would be a duplication, 
since the interest rate applied in capitalizing net income 
provides for a return of capital value as well as interest. 
[26a,26b] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-The 
assessor may not be required to deduct the present lessee's 
charges for rent and amortization from estimated gross income 
when valuing possessory interests by an analysis of anticipated 
earning power. (Disapproving L. W. Blinn Lumber 00. v. 
Los Angeles Oounty, 216 Cal. 468, 474, 14 P.2d 512.) 
[27] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valuation.-In deter-
mining the income to be capitalized to establish value for 
appraisal purposes, there will be no "waste" of capital when 
the purchaser's cost equals the capital value of the property; 
if the cost exceeds this value, there is a wastage of capital, 
but only at the time of purchase and it is properly disregarded 
by persons valuing property in terms of future income. 
[28] Id;-Assessment - Valuation - Leasehold Estates.-Though 
the value of leaseholds, when no deduction from income is 
made for amortization and rent, may approach the estimated 
fee values of the land and improvements, near equality be-
tween the two estimated values would not of itself demonstrate 
invalidity in the valuation of either one. 
[29] Id. - Assessment - Valuation - Leasehold Estates. - Near 
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equality of leasehold values to those of the fee of tax exempt 
land of the federal government does not necessarily constitute 
a violation of the immunity of such governmcnt from taxation 
by the states; where the tax is imposed solely on the privately 
owned possessory interest of the lessee (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§§ 104, 107, 201), and under the terms of the lease will be 
paid entirely by the lessee (see 12 U.S.C. § 1748£), neither its 
legal nor economic incidence falls on the federal government. 
(30] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-In deter-
mining the value of leaseholds in tax exempt property of the 
federal government, it is erroneous to impute an income of 
6 per cent and taxes of 2 per cent to an amount somewhat 
less than the estimated fee value of the land and improve-
ments, to deduct from the imputed income the rent paid to the 
government, and to capitalize the difference at 8 per cent, 
since the deduction from imputed income of the rent sub-
stitutes valuation according to the profitableness of the prop-
erty to its present owner for the statutory standard of "full 
cash value" (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 401), and no adequate dis-
tinction is made between imputed gross income and imputed 
net incomE'. 
(31] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Bstates.-The value 
of leaseholds in tax exempt property located in a military 
reservation and devoted solely to housing designated persons 
at rents regulated by the federal government can be estimated 
more accurately by capitalizing expected future actual net 
income instead of an imputed income, since the income from 
the possessory interests will be from subrentals and can be 
ascribed entirely to the possessory estates, and since future 
income can be expected to remain stable 
[32] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Deductions.-In estimating the 
"full cash value" of possessory estates in tax exempt property, 
it is error to deduct annual "burdens," including payments 
of principal and interest on mortgage debts, from annual 
"benefits" and thereby compute a value that is inversely pro-
portional to the size of mortgage debt payments, since deduc-
tion of "credits secured by mortgage or trust deed" :s contrary 
to Const., art. XIII, § 1. 
[33] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Possessory Estates.-In esti-
mating the "full cash value" of possessory estates in tax 
exempt property, it is error to give a present value to net 
"burdens," since this assumes that annual losses expected to 
be sustained in future years have a present value in the same 
sense as money to be received in regular future instaUments, 
and would in effect alter the property tax from a levy on the 
present value of property to a tax on the net worth of 
the individual taxpayer. 
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[34] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-The value 
of a leasehold estate in tax exempt property may not be prop-
erly computed by deducting the present lessee's anticipated 
annual charges to operating expenses, taxes, rent, and amorti-
zation of money invested in the leasehold, together with in-
• terest thereon, from anticipated annual gross income, so that 
the difference, when capitalized and reduced to the "proper" 
ratio of assessment to market values may be deemed the value 
of the possessory interest, since deduction of amortization does 
not conform either to the statutory standard of value or to 
the accepted principles of capitalization. 
[35] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-In assess-
ing a leasehold estate in lands owned by the federal govern-
ment, the county board of equalization should deduct from 
annual gross income the annual operating and maintenance 
expenses and the amount of a deposit to a replacement reserve, 
it should capitalize the difference at the rate it determines 
will allow for risk, interest and taxes, and the period of cap-
italization should be the remaining years of the lease, despite 
a permissive provision for termination of the lease by the 
government after a specified number of years. 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County and from orders remanding the proceedings 
to the county board of equalization. L. N. Turrentine, Judge. 
Reversed with directions. 
Actions to recover taxes paid under protest. Judgments 
for plaintiffs reversed with directions. 
James Don Keller, District Attorney and County Counsel, 
Carroll H. Smith, Deputy County Counsel, Edmund G. 
Brown, Attorney General, E. G. Benard and James E. Sabine, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant. 
Joel E. Ogle, County Counsel (Orange County), George F. 
Holden and Stephen K. Tamura, Deputy County Counsel, 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
Holbrook, Tan, Carter & O'Neill, W. Sumner Holbrook, 
Jr., Francis H. O'Neill, Alexander W. Rutan, Robert A. 
Oakes and Oakes & Horton for Respondents. 
Horton & Foote, Joseph K. Horton, Rex A. McKittrick, 
Lawler, Felix & Hall, Riley & Hall, Latham & Watkins, 
Dana Latham, Samuel J. Nunn, Charles P. Lester, Overton, 
Lyman, Prince & Vermille, Eugene Overton, Allard, Shelton 
) 
) 
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& 0 'Connor, Irl D. Brett, Rodge L. Dolle, Read, Jacobs, 
Corfman & Jacobs, Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Paul, Hastings 
& Janofsky, S. V. O. Prichard, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, 
Herbert F. Sturdy and Frank L. Mallory as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Actions to recover taxes, levied against 
possessory interests in tax exempt land and improvements 
and paid under protest, were brought against the county of 
San Diego (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 5103, 5138) in 1953 by 
De Luz Homes and in 1954 by De Luz Homes, Wire Mountain 
Homes Number 1 and Wire Mountain Homes Number 2. The 
county appeals from judgments in favor of plaintiffs and 
from orders remanding the proceedings to the county board 
of equalization. The 1953 and 1954 actions raise the same 
substantive question and have been consolidated on appeal. 
De Luz Homes is a 562-unit housing project located on 
land owned by the United States Government at Camp Pen-
dleton, a military installation in San Diego County. The 
project provides housing for military and civilian personnel 
stationed at the camp at maximum rentals prescribed by the 
Federal Housing Administration and the Department of the 
Navy and was constructed under the provisions of title VIII 
of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1748-1748h 
[known as the Wherry Act]) and section 522a of title 34 
of the United States Code. Title VIII provides, "In order 
to assist in relieving the acute shortage of housing which 
now exists at or in areas adjacent to military installations 
. . • and to increase the supply of rental housing accommo-
dations available to military and civilian personnel at such 
installations, the [Federal Housing] Commissioner is author-
ized . . . to insure mortgages . . • [on] property . . . des-
ignated for rent for residential use by civilian or military 
personnel of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force 
. . . assigned to duty at the military installation at or in 
the area of which such property is constructed." (12 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1748b(a) , (b) (2) ; see Senate Report on Military and Naval 
Installations-Construction, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. Rep. 
No. 727.) Section 522a of title 34 of the United States Code 
authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to lease property under 
the control of the Department of the Navy whenever it shall 
be advantageous to the government. 
In July, 1952, the United States Government, acting 
through the Secretary of the Navy, leased a single parcel of 
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95.22 acres at Camp Pendleton to De Luz Homes, Inc., a 
Delaware corporation, for a period of 75 years at an annual 
ground rental of $100. The lease, as amended, states that 
the Secretary of the Navy has determined that lease of the 
premises will effectuate the purpose of "erecting, maintaining, 
and operating thereon a housing project, consisting of ap-
proximately 562 units, substantially in accordance with de-
tailed plans and specifications submitted by the Department 
of the Navy .•. and approved by the Federal Housing 
Commissioner." In addition to building and equipping the 
project and paying the ground rental, the lessee is required 
to obtain mortgage insurance from the Federal Housing 
Administration, to lease the units at rents specified by the 
Federal Housing Administration and the Department of the 
Navy to persons designated by the commanding general of 
the camp, to maintain the premises for the term of the lease, 
to provide protection against fire and other losses, and to 
"pay to the proper authority, when and as the same become 
due and payable. all taxes, assessments, and similar charges 
which, at any time during the term of this lease, may be 
taxed, assessed or imposed upon the Government or upon 
the Lessee with respect to or upon the leased premises." The 
government promises to provide "when and as available" fire 
and police protection on a nonreimbursable basis and has 
reserved rights of inspection and a right of way to connect 
the project with the school site adjoining it. The buildings 
and other improvements erected by De Luz became the 
property of the United States as they were completed, and 
all ranges, refrigerators, and other items required by the 
plans must remain on the premises and will become the prop-
erty of the United States after the mortgage debt is paid. 
Under its contract of mortgage insurance with the Federal 
Housing Administration, the lessee is required to pay an 
annual insurance premium, to insure the improvements against 
fire and other losses, and to accumulate a fund for replacing 
worn-out improvements and equipment. Under the terms of 
the lease, the lessee must continue to insure and to accumu-
late a replacement reserve for the remainder of the lease 
after the mortgage debt is paid. The lease cannot be trans-
ferred or assigned by De Luz without written approval of 
the government, but may be terminated by the government 
upon 60 days' notice in the event of default by De Luz in 
the payment of the annual ground rental or accumulation 
and maintenance of the replacement reserve, or, irrespective 
of default, after 50 years from execution of the lease. 
,J 
"' .. "' 
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De Luz, at its sole expense, had 562 housing units constructed 
in accordance with the plans drawn by the Department of 
the Navy and installed therein ranges, refrigerators, screens, 
shades, and other items designated in the plans. Construction 
of the entire project cost somewhat in excess of $4,516,000, 
and to finance it De Luz borrowed from the Republic National 
Bank of Dallas, Texas, approximately $4,600,000, at 5 per 
cent per year, payable in full 30 days after completion of 
the project. After the project was completed, De Luz re-
financed the loan by borrowing from the First National Bank 
of Boston approximately $4,516,000, at 4 per cent per year 
and repayable in fixed annual installments, including interest, 
of $248,388. The installment payments began on February 1, 
1954, and will continue thereafter for 32 years and eight 
months until 1986. To secure the loan, De Luz gave the 
bank a mortgage on its leasehold interest and, as required by 
its lease, purchased a mortgage insurance policy from the 
Federal Housing Administration. 
All net income from subrentals becomes the property of 
De Luz, and the company estimates that its maximum poten-
tial gross income, assuming 100 per cent occupancy, is $552,354 
per year. It forecasts, however, that after making a 20 per 
cent allowance for vacancies and paying $27,967 into the 
replacement reserve, $251,271 for maintenance and operating 
expenses, and $248,388 in payment of its loan, it will expend 
$55,238 annually in excess of income until its mortgage debt 
is repaid. After 1986, however, when it will have repaid the· 
loan, it expects income to exceed disbursements by $214,762 
per year.! The Federal Housing Administration estimates 
that at 100 per cent occupancy De Luz would receive a gross 
income of $554,980 per year, and that with a 3 per cent 
vacancy allowance and deductions of $156,401 for operating 
expenses, $27,967 for accumulation of the replacement reserve, 
and $38,400 for taxes, but without a deduction for repayment 
of the loan, De Luz will receive an annual net income of 
$305,862. 
On Monday, July 20, 1953, after the regular assessment 
period for the tax year 1953-1954 (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 405) 
and during the period for equalization (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 1603), De Luz appeared by counsel before the Board of 
'In July, 1953, when the project was about 70 per cent completed, 
De Luz predicted that maximum gross income, after a 10 per cent 
vacancy allowance, would be $490,482, that disbursements would exceed 
income by $35,267.08 per year until 1986, and that thereafter, with the 
loan repaid, annual income would exceed expenses by $235,701.92. 
) 
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Supervisors of San Dicgo County sitting as a board of equali-
zation. It statcd that De Luz Homes had not been assessed, 
that it waived the five-day notice to which it was entitled 
by statute (Rev. & 'l'ax. Code, § 1611), and that it petitioned 
th~ board "to add an assessment of a possessory interest to 
the De Luz Homes . . . the same being exempt property of 
the United States, and the assessment to be of a possessory 
interest therein with a full cash value of $40,350.00." The 
assessor objected, stating that he had not been able to assess 
De Luz because of insufficient information as to personal 
property on the premises, that his office had delayed the 
assessment to give the taxpayer sufficient time to gather 
information, and that his office had "not had any coopera-
tion from the taxpayer." The board denied the petition by 
De Luz with the understanding that as soon as the assessor 
obtained a full statement of personal property the entire 
assessment would be put on the roll. On July 31, 1953, the 
assessor entered an assessment of De Luz for the tax year 
1953-1954 at a valuation of $86,690 for the possessory interest 
in land, $487,380 for the possessory interest in improvements, 
and $61,380 for personal property, and he levied taxes thereon 
totalling $35,013.29. De Luz filed an application with the 
board to reduce the assessment (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 1604, 
1607), and on August 24, 1953, the board held a hearing, 
received oral and written evidence, and denied the application. 
De Luz thereupon paid the full amount of the levy, filed a 
protest contending that $29,738.57 of the tax was excessive 
and void, and filed an action to recover the allegedly excessive 
amount and for revaluation of its possessory interest in land 
and improvements. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 5138.) The court 
found that the assessment had not been made during the 
regular assessment period, that it was not properly an "eseape 
assessment" (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 531), and that it therefore 
was void. The court also concluded that certain personal 
property on the premises had been transferred to the United 
States Government prior to the first Monday in March of 
1953 and was not taxable, and that in valuing the possessory 
interest in land and improvements the assessor had used an 
illegal method that resulted in a constructively fraudulent 
tax. The court found, however, that De Luz "expressly 
waive [d] any objection to said assessment so far as said 
'personal property' was concerned . . . [and] at all times 
herein has conceded an equitable and moral duty to be 
assessed in the sum of not more than $40,350 for said tax 
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ments and to pay taxes in a totul sum of $1,892.68 therein." 
1'he court ordered the board of equalization to reconvene, to 
take new evidence of value, to recompute the value of the 
possessory interest in accord with the formula offered by 
De Luz, and to enter such value on the tax roll in lieu of 
the value entered by the assessor, provided that no amount 
less than $40,350 be entered. 
During the next regular assessment period for the tax year 
1954-1955, the assessor valued the possessory interest of De 
Luz Homes in land at $108,909 and in improvements at 
$896,518, resulting in a total valuation of $1,005,427, and 
levied a tax thereon of $50,372.04. An application for reduc-
tion of the valuation and the tax thereon was filed with th0 
board of equalization and denied. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 1605, 
1607. ) De Luz paid the tax under protest, filed a claim for 
refund with the board of supervisors (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 5096), and, after its denial, filed an action in the superior 
court to recover the taxes. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 5103.) 
Wire Mountain Homes Number 1 and Wire Mountain 
Homes Number 2 also are housing units for military and 
civilian personnel assigned to duty at military bases in San 
Diego County, As in the case of De Luz Homes, they are 
located on land leased from the federal government, were 
constructed pursuant to title VIII of the National Housing 
Act (12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1748-1748h), were financed by loans 
secured by mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration, and are subleased at rents prescribed by the 
Federal Housing Administration and the Department of the 
Navy. Until 1986, when the mortgage loan will have been 
repaid, annual disbursements, including debt repayment, are 
expected to exceed income from subrentals and thereafter 
income is expected substantially to exceed disbursements. 
For the tax year 1954-1955 the assessor valued the possessory 
interests of the Wire Mountain projects by the same method 
used for De Luz Homes. Wire Mountain Homes paid the 
taxes levied on the possessory interests under protest, filed 
claims for refund with the board of supervisors, and, after 
the claims were denied, filed actions for recovery of the 
amounts paid. 
The 1954 actions by De Luz and Wire Mountain Homes 
were consolidated for trial, and the court found that the 
value of each of the possessory interests was zero, that the 
method of valuation used by the assessor was improper, and 
that the tax based on such method constituted constructive 
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fraud. As in the 1953 action by De Luz, the court ordered 
the board of equalization to reconvene, to take new evidence 
of value, to recompute the value of the possessory interests 
by a method specified by the court, and to order the assessor 
tQ enter the new assessment on the tax roll in lieu of the 
amount previously approved by the board. The court retained 
jurisdiction to review the proceedings of the board and to 
make such further orders. findings of fact, and judgments, 
including repayment of taxes (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 5141), 
as might be necessary. 
In the method of valuation employed by the assessor, the 
fee value of the land is estimated "by the same methods 
and approaches to value that [are used in assessing] all other 
taxable land in the county, similarly situated and of a similar 
nature." A percentage of the amount so estimated is deducted 
as an allowance for restrictions on the use of the property 
imposed by the lease, and to the difference, known as the base 
value, is imputed an income equal to a reasonable rate of 
return on the base value. In the case of De Luz, the assessor 
found the reasonable rate of return to be 6 per cent, and 
he added an additional 2 per cent for taxes. The percentage 
representing reasonable income and taxes, known as the 
"economic rental" of the leasehold, was translated into 
numerieal figures from each of the leaseholds, and from it 
was deducted the lessee's rent to the government, a nominal 
amount of $100 reduced to $35 to allow for the ratio of assess-
ment value to market value normally used by the assessor. 
The difference between the imputed income and the rent 
charged by the government, known as the lessee's "equity" 
or "bonus value" in the leasehold, was capitalized at the 
rate of 8 per cent for the remaining years of the lease, and 
the amount so computed was deemed the present value of 
the lessee's equity. A safety factor for overlooked burdens 
was deducted from it, and the remaining amount was entered 
on the tax roll as the value of the possessory interest in the 
government-owned land. The improvements were valued in 
an essentially identical manner: Their value was estimated 
as if they were owned in fee; percentage deductions were 
made for depreeiation and restrictions on use imposed by the 
lease; an "economic rental" of 8 per cent was imputed to 
the difference. Since the government charges no rent for 
the improvements, the II eeonomic rental" equaled the lessee's 
"equity," and its present value, when capitalized at 8 per 
cent for the remaining years of the lease and reduced by 
I 
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a safety factor for undiscovered burdens, was deemed the 
taxable value of the improvements. 
Concluding that this method failed to take annual benefits 
and burdens into account and therefore was improper, the 
court directed the board of equalization to take evidence on 
expected annual gross income, expected annual operating 
expenses, the rate of capitalization that would allow for ad 
valorem taxes, the amount of money that plaintiffs had 
invested in their leaseholds, and the annual sum required to 
amortize their investments together with interest thereon at 
6 per cent. The board was ordered to compute the value 
of the possessory interests by using actual expected net 
income, rather than imputed income. It was directed to 
deduct annual operating expenses and amortization from 
annual gross income, to capitalize the difference for 52 years 
at a rate equal to 6 per cent plus an appropriate allowance 
for taxes, to reduce the amount so computed to 35 per cent 
thereof to allow for the "proper" ratio of assessed value 
to market value, and to enter the net result on the tax roll 
as the value of the possessory interests in the leaseholds. 
In addition to remanding the proceedings to the board, 
the court made specific findings as to the values of the posses-
sory interests for the tax years 1953-1954 and 1954-1955. 
It found the possessory interest of De Luz to have a total 
value in 1953, for both land and improvements, of $7,700, 
as opposed to the assessor's total valuation of $574,070, and 
in 1954 it found that each of the possessory interests had 
a value of zero, as compared with estimates by the assessor 
of $1,005,427 for De Luz, $112,440 for Wire Mountain Homes 
Number 1, and $129,750 for Wire Mountain Homes Number 2. 
In reaching these results, the court employed a method of 
valuation different from that which it ordered the board to 
follow. It deducted "annual burdens" (total annual dis-
bursements, including operating expenses, payments into the 
replacement reserve, and payments of principal and interest 
on the mortgage debts) from "annual benefits" (annual gross 
income), and found that until 1986, when the debts will have 
been repaid. annual burdens will exceed annual benefits, and 
that thereafter annual benefits will exceed burdens. Capital-
izing the expected excess of burdens over benefits and the 
expected excess of benefits over burdens over a period 8f 52 
years, the court found that the capitalized value of net 
burdens exceeded the capitalized value of net benefits. It 
interpreted this result to mean that the present value of 
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future income ftom the leaseholds was less than zero, and 
that therefore the possessory interests have no value at this 
time. In the case of De Luz, for example, it found that 
"burdens" will exceed "benefits" by $55,238 per year until 
1986, and that "benefits" will exceed "burdens" thereafter 
by $214,762 per year. It computed the present value of 
$55,238 per year for 32 years commencing in 1954 as 
$1,043,813 and the present value of $214,762 per year for 
19 years commencing in 1986 as $218,474. Subtracting the 
present worth of net "benefits" from the present worth of 
net "burdens," it obtained a figure of $825,339. It inter-
preted this figure to mean that the prescnt value of expendi-
tures was greater than the present value of profits, and that 
therefore De Luz had no taxable value at the time of assess-
ment. The county contends that the 1953 assessment of 
De Luz was timely, that the method of valuation employed 
by its assessor is valid, and that the values of the leaseholds 
as found by the assessor and approved by the board of equali-
zation are correct. 
Timeliness of the 1953 Assessment of De Luz Homes 
[1] "If any property belonging on the local roll has 
escaped assessment, the assessor shall assess the property on 
discovery at its value on the lien date for the year for which 
it escaped assessment •.. " (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 531.) 
Thus, when property is not assessed between the first Mondays 
in March and July for any tax year, the assessor is required 
to assess it when he discovers its physical existence, its tax-
able status (see Imperial Irr. Dist. v. County of Riverside, 
96 Cal.App.2d 402, 407 [215 P.2d 518]), or the fact that 
it has not been assessed. (Carpenter v. Pacific Coast Ins. 
Assn., 10 Ca1.2d 304, 306 [74 P.2d 511].) [2] Only if a 
delayed assessment were caused by the assessor's negligence 
and would cause substantial injury to the taxpayer has it 
been suggested that such assessment may be improper. (See 
Carpenter v. Pac·i/ic Coast Ins. Assn., supra, 10 Ca1.2d 304, 
306.) In the present case, however, there is no indication 
either that the assessor was negligent or that De Luz acted 
to its detriment in reliance on the fact that it was not assessed 
during the regular assessment period. Instead, the record 
discloses that De Luz appeared before the board of equaliza-
tion on the third Monday in July of 1953 and asked that it 
be assessed at figures it supplied. The assessor appeared in 
opposition to the petition and stated that he had insufficient 
information properly to assess De Luz Homes at that time, 
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that he had attempted to cooperate with the taxpayer, and 
that the taxpayer had given him conflicting information about 
personal property on the p.remises. The board passed a 
motion authorizing the assessor to enter an assessment as 
soon as he secured sufficient information. [3] It is con-
tended that this authorization was improperly granted because 
it was not preceded by five days' notice as required by section 
1611 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. That section pro-
vides: "After five days succeeding the time when notice 
of the date when the matter will be investigated is sent by 
the clerk of the county board to all persons interested, the 
county board may direct the assessor to: (a) Assess any 
taxable property other than State assessed property that has 
escaped assessment." When both De Luz and the assessor 
appeared before the board on the third Monday in July and 
argued, respectively, that an immediate assessment should be 
made and that assessment should be delayed, the matter was 
"investigated" within the meaning of the statute, and neither 
De Luz nor the assessor can now complain that they did not 
receive five days' notice of the meeting. De Luz, moreover, 
specifically waived notice and requested immediate assess-
ment at the valuations it offered. [4] Since the board could 
have concluded that the assessor had not had sufficient infor-
mation to make an assessment up to the time of the hearing, 
and since there is no evidence that the board acted arbitrarily 
or abused its discretion, its directions to the assessor cannot 
be set aside. (McOlelland v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Ca1.2d 
124, 129 [180 P.2d 676] ; Los Angeles etc. 00. v. Oounty of 
Los Angeles, 162 Cal. 164, 170 [121 P. 384, 9 A.L.R. 1277] ; 
Utah Oonst. 00. v. Richardson, 187 Cal. 649, 655 [203 P. 401] ; 
ct., Universal Oonsol. Oil 00. V. Byram, 25 Ca1.2d 353, 356, 357 
[153 P.2d 746].) [5] The assessor entered his assessment 
without further notice to De Luz on July 31, 1953, and since 
neither the order of the board nor any statute required such 
notice, and since the assessment was made in accord with 
the directions of the board, it was validly entered on the 
tax roll. 
Pke Valuatitm ot Possessory Interests in paz 
Exempt Property 
[6a] The standard of valuation prescribed by the Legis-
lature is that, "[A]ll taxable property shall be assessed at 
its full cash value." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 401.) "Full cash 
value, " as defined in section 110 of the Revenue and Taxation 
Code, "means the amount at which property would be taken 
in payment of a 'just debt from a solvent debtor." (It pro-
,) 
) 
562 DE Luz HOMES, INC. v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO [45 C.2d 
vides, in other words, for an assessment at the price that 
property would bring to its owner if it were offered for sale 
on an open market under conditions in which neither buyer 
nor seller could take advantage of the exigencies of the other. 
It is a measure of desirability translated into money amounts • (see Brandeis, J., concurring in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern 
Bell Tel. 00. v. Public Service Oom., 262 U.S. 276, 310 [43 
8.Ct. 544, 67 L.Ed. 981]), and might be called the market 
value of property for use in its present condition. Indeed, 
section 401 of the Revenue and Taxation Code as originally 
enacted (Pol. Code, § 3627) contained the words "market 
value" as the standard for valuation of the stock of domestic 
corporations, and after "market value" was deleted in 1881 
(Stats., 1881, ch. LUI, p. 57), this court stated that the 
term had been synonymous with" full cash value." (Orocker 
v. Scott, 149 Cal. 575, 585 [87 P. 102] ; see also San Francisco 
Nat. Bank v. Dodge, 197 U.S. 70, 79 [25 S.Ct. 384, 49 
L.Ed 669].) 
[7] This standard of value must be used in the assessment 
of all taxable property, for the Constitution of California 
states, "All property in the State except as otherwise in this 
Constitution provided, not exempt under the laws of the 
United States, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to 
be ascertained as provided by law, or as hereinafter provided." 
(Art. XIII, § 1.) [8] The Constitution requires not only 
that all nonexempt property be taxed (Ohesebrough v. Oity 
&- Oounty of San Francisco, 153 Cal. 559, 568-569 [96 P. 
288] ; Orocker v. Scott, 149 Cal. 575, 585 [87 P. 102]), but 
that except as otherwise specified all property be assessed 
by the same standard of valuation. (Mahoney v. Oity of San 
Diego, 198 Cal. 388, 398, 403 [245 P. 189] ; Wilson v. Oounty 
of Sutter, 47 Cal. 91, 92 [construing substantially similar pro-
vision in Const. 1848, art. XI, § 13].) Thus, it was held 
reversible error for a board of equalization to value one type 
of property at the price it would bring as salvage while 
valuing other property at the price it would bring in its 
present use and condition. (Mahoney v. Oity of San Diego, 
supra, 198 Cal. 388, 400-402.) 
[9] Since nonexempt possessory interests in land and 
improvements, such as the leasehold estates involved in the 
present actions,2 are taxable property (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
·The possessory interest is admittedly taxable in the hands of the 
present lessees, and would be taxable even if they defaulted and the 
leaseholds were assumed by the Federal Housing Commissioner. (12 
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§§ 201, 104, 107; Parr-Richmond Industrial Corp. v. Boyd, 
43 Ca1.2d 157, 164 [272 P.2d 16]; Km:ser Co. v. Reid, 30 
Ca1.2d 610, 618 [184 P.2d 8J9]; see Delaney v. Lowrey, 25 
Ca1.2d 561, 564 [154 P.2d 674]), they too must be assessed 
at "full cash value." [10] In practice, assessors usually 
enter the entire value of land and improvements on the tax 
roll without distinction between possessory and reversionary 
interests, and since this practice results in a single amount 
reflecting both interests on the roll, the constitutional mandate 
that all property be taxed is obeyed. (San Pedro, etc. R. R. 
00. v. City of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 18, 22 [179 P. 393].) 
[11] As between reversioners and possessors payment of the 
tax is a private arrangement. (S·imms v. County of Los An-
geles, 35 Cal.2d 303, 313 [217 P.2d 936] ; San Pedro, etc. R. R. 
00. v. Oity of Los Angeles, s-upra, 180 Cal. 18, 22; Lick v. 
Austin, 43 Cal. 590, 594-596.) [12] When, however, the pos-
sessory interest is taxable and the reversion is exempt, only the 
possessory interest is subject to assessment and taxation. 
(Pasadena v. Oounty of Los Angeles, 182 Cal. 171, 176 [187 P. 
418]; People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 645, 661.) "When ... 
there is a lease of land owned by the state or a municipality, 
the reversion being exempt from taxation, the usufructuary 
interest alone is subject to tax in proportion to its value; 
and in the absence of agreement to the contrary, the tax 
necessarily falls upon the lessee." (Hammond Lbr. 00. v. 
Oounty of Los Angeles, 104 Cal.App. 235, 240 [285 P. 896].) 
[13] Since the possessory interest must be assessed in 
accord with the standard of valuation applicable to all other 
property, its estimated value is the price it would bring if 
offered on an open market under conditions in which neither 
buyer nor seller could take advantage of the exigencies of 
the other, and this hypothetical market price is its value 
even though a sale of the property has not been made or 
contemplated. [14] It is well settled that "the absence 
of an 'actual market' for a particular type of property does 
not mean that it has no value or that it may escape from 
the constitutional mandate that 'all property • • . shall be 
taxed in proportion to its value' (Art. XIII, § 1) but only 
that the assessor must then use such pertinent factors as 
replacement costs and income analyses for determining 'val-
uation.'" (Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Ca1.2d 610, 623 [184 
P.2d 879].) • 
[15] Assessors generally estimate value by analyzing 
market data on sales of similar property, replacement costs, 
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and income from the property (see 1 Bonbright, Valuation 
of Property, pp. 113-2G6; Amcrican Institute of Real Estate 
Appraisers, The Appraisal of Real Estate, pp. 75-85; Fisher, 
Real Estate in California, p. 157), and since no one of these 
met)lOds alone can be used to estimate the value of all prop-
erty, the assessor, subject to requirements of fairness and 
uniformity, may exercise his discretion in using one or more 
of them. (Utah Oonst. 00. v. Richardson, 187 Cal. 649, 
652-653 [203 P. 401] ; Southern Calif. Tel. Co. v. Oounty of 
Los Angeles, 45 Cal.App.2d 111, 116-118 [113 P.2d 773].) 
[16] The assessing authority's estimate of the value of specific 
property at a specific time is reviewed by the board of equal-
ization at the request of the taxpayer (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§§ 1601-1615), and the board's decision in regard to specific 
valuations and the methods of valuation employed are equiva-
lent to the findings and judgment of a trial court and review-
able only for arbitrariness, abuse of discretion, or failure to 
follow the standards prescribed by the Legislature. (McClel-
land v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 30 Cal.2d 124, 129; 
Universal Consolo Oil 00. v_ Byram, supra, 25 Ca1.2d 353, 356; 
Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Richardson, 182 Cal. 115, 128 [187 P. 
411] ; Los Angeles etc. Co. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 
162 Cal. 164, 168.) 
[17] In the present case, the assessor purported to value 
the leaseholds by the capitalization of income method, a gen-
crally accepted method of valuing property from which income 
may be or is derived. (Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Cal.2d 610, 623 
[184 P.2d 879]; Pullman 00. v. Richardson, 185 Cal. 484, 
496 [197 P. 346]; Alpaugh Irr. DiBt. v. Oounty of Kern, 
113 Cal.App.2d 286, 293 [248 P.2d 117]; Birch v. Oounty 
of Orange, 59 Cal.App. 133, 138 [210 P. 57] ; H. & W. P·ierce, 
Inc. V. O(Junty of Santa Barbara, 40 Cal.App. 302,306 [180 P. 
641] ; see Wild Goose C. Club v. County of Butte, 60 Cal. 
App. 339, 341 [212 P. 711].) According to this method, 
the value of property is the sum of anticipated future 
installments of net income from the property, less an allow-
ance for interest and the risk of partial or no receipt. (See 
American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, The Appraisal 
of Real Estate, chs. 17, 18; Babcock, The Valuation of Real 
Estate, pp. 39, 127-129; 1 Bonbright, The Valuation of Prop-
erty, ch. XI.) "[I]t involves a capitalization or discounted 
valuation of the realized or prospective net monetary income 
derivable by continuous exploitation rather than by resale." 
(1 Bonbright, op. cit. supra, p. 230.) [18] The first step in 
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the process is to determine prospective net income and this 
is done by estimating future gross income and deducting 
therefrom expected necessary, expenses incident to mainte-
nance and operation of the property. In instances ill 
which future income cannot be estimated with reasonable 
accuracy or is not ascribable entirely to the property, pros. 
pective net monetary income is imputed in an amount equal 
to a minimum reasonable return on estimated market value. 
(See Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Ca1.2d 610, 623 [184 P.2d 879].) 
[19] Since it is generally accepted that a person who agrees 
to receive payment in the future is entitled to interest both 
for waiting and the risk of partial or no receipt, the second 
step is to discount each future installment of income by a 
rate of interest that takes into account the hazards of the 
investment and the accepted concepts of a "fair return." 
The sum of the discounted installments is the present value 
of the property.8 An apt example of determining the value 
of property by the capitalization of net income method is 
given by counsel in a companion case: Assume that the most 
effective use that may be made of an item of property is 
the rental thereof, that the property may be rented for a 
period of three years (at the end of which it will be worthless) 
for a gross rental of $120 a year, to be paid at the end of 
the year, that the expenses, e.g., repairs, of the lessor incident 
to the property will be $20 a year, also to be paid at the 
end of the year, and that a 6 per cent rate of return is 
appropriate to the amount of risk involved to the lessor. 
The value of the property will be determined as follows: 
Annual gross income ...........•..•..•.•.••.... $120.00 
Annual expense ............••••••••.••••••.. 20.00 
Annual net income ......•.•..•••••..... $100.00 
Present worth of $100 to be received: 
1 year in the future ($100 x .9434)4 ... $94.34 
2 years in the future ($100 x .89)4 .... 89.00 
3 years in the future ($100 x .8396) 4.. 83.96 
Value of property ...................... $267.30 
-:In practice, the present value of an amount to be received in regular 
future installments is computed by multiplying the annual amount by 
a present value factor that reflects interest, risk, and, if applicable, a 
decline in income in later years. (See American Institute of Real Estate 
Appraisers, The Appraisal of Real Estate. Appendix, tables I·IX; 
Finney, Principles of Accounting, [3d ed.] ch. 10; Schmutz, Co'hdemna· 
tion Appraisal Handbook, ch. 9.) 
6The coefficients for a 6 per cent return were taken from a standard 
discount table printed in Babcock, Valuation of Real Estate, p. 538. 
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[6b] In valuing property, the assessor must adhere to 
the statutory standard of "full cash value," and must there-
fore estimate the price the property would bring on an open 
market under conditions in which neither buyer nor seller 
co~d take advantage of the exigencies of the other. [20] The 
net earnings to be capitalized, therefore, are not those of the 
present owner of the property, but those that would be antici-
pated by a prospective purchaser. "Anticipated future earn-
ing power is the sole matter of consequence, since reported 
earnings are already water under the mill." (Bonbright, 
OPe cit. supra, p. 229; see also Babcock, OPe cit. supra, pp. 
229-230.) The present owner may have invested well or 
poorly, may have contracted to pay very high or very low 
rent, and may have built expensive improvements or none 
at all. To value property by capitalizing his anticipated net 
earnings would make the value of property equal to the 
present value of his profits; since, however, the legislative 
standard of value is "full cash value," it is clear that what-
ever may be the rationale of the property tax, it is not the 
profitableness of property to its present owner. If a pur-
chaser would buy a given property on an open market, the 
property has a value equal to the price such purchaser might 
be expected to pay. 
[21] The standard of "full cash value" applies equally 
to a leasehold interest. Accordingly, the assessor must esti-
mate the price a leasehold would bring on an open market 
under conditions in which neither buyer nor seller could take 
advantage of the exigencies of the other. He must therefore 
capitalize, not the anticipated net earnings of the present les-
see, but those of a prospective assignee. [22] To a prospective 
assignee, anticipated net earnings equal expected gross income 
less necessary expenditures for maintenance, operation, and 
taxes. G No deduction is made for the cost of the lease to 
the present lessee, i.e., his charges for rent and amortization 
of improvements, for to a prospective assignee the value of 
a leasehold is measured solely by anticipated gross income 
less expected necessary expenditures. 
[23] In Blinn Lbr. 00. V. Oounty of Los Angeles, 216 
Cal. 474, 481 [14 P.2d 512], this court stated that a person 
• Although taxes are themselves based on value, the tax rate is known. 
and therefore an allowance for taxes can be expressed as a percentage 
of the value to be found. In practice, an allowance for taxes is usually 
made as an addition to the capitalization rate and is reflected in the 
present worth factor. (See 1 Bonbright, The ValaatiOIl of PropezV. 
p. 257.) 
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who has assumed a lease will deduct from his annual income 
statement an aliquot portion of the price he paid to acquire 
the lease and of the cost of improvements that he installed. 
Such practice is in accord with generally accepted principles 
of accounting to determine the net income and net worth 
of the present owner. (See Finney, OPe cit. supra, chs. 11, 
12.) By allocating past costs to present and future income, 
the income recipient apportions expenditures for long-term 
benefits to each revenue period in which some of the benefit 
is realized. The remaining unamortized cost appears on the 
balance sheet as an asset valued at cost less the amounts 
already charged to income. (See Finney, Ope cit. supra, 
pp. 192, 207; 2 Bonbright, OPe cit. supra, p. 894 et seq.) 
Although this procedure is sound accounting practice to 
determine the net income and net. worth of the present owner, 
it will not reflect the "full cash value" of the property. The 
accountant deals with past historical cost to the present owner 
and by the process of amortization spreads the cost of property 
over its useful life. (Babcock, OPe cit. supra, pp. 402-403.) 
The unamortized cost reflected on the balance sheet has no 
relation to the "full cash value," i.e., the price that a willing 
buyer would pay a willing seller. 
[24] Furthermore, in determining the income to be cap-
italized to establish value for appraisal purposes, no deduction 
can be made for amortization. (Fisher, Nature of Capital 
and Income, pp. 238, 255.) "[N]o concept of income which 
includes . . • depreciation in capital value as a positive or 
negative item of income, is acceptable as a basis of valuation 
under the 'capitalized-income' method." (Bonbright, OPe 
cit. supra, p. 910 citing Fisher.) "[I]n valuation, net earn-
ings are net 'before depreciation,' i.e., net earnings are a 
combination of income and capital returns and are c·omputed 
as the actual difference between the 'puts' and 'takes.' Ap-
praising presupposes a purchaser, and the valuation is made 
at a figure which the net earnings can support including a 
return of capital equal to the successive losses of value 
expected in the depreciation of the property. Since the value 
is the end and object of valuation, the process cannot include 
an expense item based upon the answer." (Babcock, Ope cit. 
supra, p. 420.) [25] Rent paid for a leasehold interest, 
like the cost of improvements that revert to the le.ssor, is 
part of the cost or purchase price of the leasehold, and to 
include a deduction for it, is likewise to include an item of 
expense based on the answer, i.e., the value of the property. 
) 
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Thus, it would not only be anomalous to deduct any part of 
that value, the very answer sought, from the income that is 
to be capitalized to obtain that answer, it would be a duplica-
tion, for the interest rate applied in capitalizing net income 
provides for a return of capital value as well as interest. 
(American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, The Appraisal 
of Real Estate, p. 321; ibid., p. 214; Babcock, op. cit. supra •. 
p. 230; see example given below.6 ) 
[26a] It is apparent. therefore, that in requiring the as-
sessor to deduct the present lessee's charges for rent and 
amortization from estimated gross income the court in the 
Blinn case confused income for accounting" purposes with in-
come for appraisal purposes.6 [27] Moreover, there will be 
no "waste of capital" as feared by the court in the Blinn case 
(216 Cal. at 478) when the purchaser's cost equals the capitaJ 
value of the property. 'I If the cost exceeds this value, then 
there is a wastage of capital, but only at the time of purchase 
and it is properly disregarded by persons valuing property 
in terms of future income. 
To deduct amortization charges of the present lessee 
not only is to subtract a part of the very figure that is being 
determined, the value of the property, from the elements of 
the computation, but is to reach a valuation of zero in every 
4The Blinn case also eITed in ordering that actual rent and amorti-
zation be deducted from imputed gross income without making an 
adequate distinction between imputed gross and imputed net income_ An 
lmputed gross income must be sufficiently large to allow for expenditures 
and therefore must exceed the minimum reasonable return on an invest 
ment. The court in Blinn. howe\'er. deducted actual rental and amorti-
zation charges from an imputed gross income of 6 per cent of the fee 
value of the leased land, and also used 6 per cent as the rate of capitali-
zation. (216 Cal. at p_ 479.) It can hardly be assumed, however, that 
the same percentage that reasonably reflected the risk and interest 
incident to capitalizing net income was sufficient to serve as a basis for 
the deduction of the lessee's charges_ 
'That this capital value will be restored to the purchaser through 
operation of the capitalization of income method may be demonstrated 
by continuing the example above, p, 593, If a purchaser buys the 
property for the capitalized value of $267,30, he will receive each year 
a return of capital and interest as follows: 
Net Interest at 6 Per Cent Annual Partial 
Amount Unrecovered Capita) Return of Capita.! 
Year Rec'd Valu.. Value 
1st $100 $16.04 ($267.30x.06) $83.% ( $1:-::0-=-0--=-16-=-.0-=-4") 
2d 100 11.00 (183.:-J4x.06) 89.00 ( 100-11.00) 
3d 100 5.66 ( 94.34x.06) 94.34 ( 100- 5.66) 
Total capita.! value returned $267.30 
Amount of Capita.! 
Va.!ue Unrecovered a. 
End of Year 
$183.34 ($267.30-83.96) 
94_34 ( 183_34-89.00) 
o ( 94_34-94.34) 
Thus, the value determined by applying the capitalization rate to (tet 
income, exclusive of amortization, results in no waste of capital, for 
the annual net receipts result in a complete return of the original capital 
of $267.30 plus interest at the rute of 0 per cent on the unrecovered value 
r('mainin~ at thp end ot each year. 
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case in which the lessee had estimated future earnings cor-
rectly and had invested their present value in the leasehold.s 
Under such circumstances, . the lessee, although paying no 
property taxes would recover the full amount of his invest-
ment plus interest over the life of the lease (see example, 
supra). Thus, in the case of De Luz, the Federal Housing 
Administration estimates ~hat annual net income, after de-
ducting operating expenses, the required contribution to the 
replacement reserve, and taxes, will be $305,862 per year. 
The present value of the right to receive that amount for 
the period of the lease, 75 years, is $5,033,255, when capital-
ized at 6 per cent. If, however, an annual deduction of 
$274,279 is made from gross income to allow for recoupment 
of the lessee's investment at 6 per cent,9 ann~al income is 
but $31,583 per year, with a present value of $393,555. 
According to the estimates of De Luz, annual net income, 
except for amortization of its investment and taxes, will 
be $162,645 per year, which has a present value of $2,026,719 
at 8 per cent. If amorization is deducted, the net income 
is a negative figure, and the leasehold has a value of zero. 
There is no doubt, however, that the right to receive $162,645 
per year for 75 years has a value equal to the sum of the 
amounts to be received less a discount for risk and interest. 
De Luz invested approximately $4,516,000 to receive the an-
nual income from the lease, and in reliance on its receipt the 
First National Bank of Boston loaned the principal of the 
investment and the Federal Housing Administration insured 
the loan. In the light of these facts, to hold that the leasehold 
has a value of zero would require a unique concept of value for 
purposes of taxation entirely different from that used in the 
ordinary course of business. [26b] Statements in the Blinn 
~hus. using the fiy-ures of the previous example, a deduction for 
amortization of the investment in the property in estimating future net 
income gives the following absurd result: 
"A.nnual income ..................••••••••••...... 1120.00 
Annual expense 
"(a) Repairs ...........•.••••.•.•••..• 20 
(b) Amortization of cost in equal annual 
payments over 3 years with 6% in-
terest on unrecovered cost ...•.••••. 100 
"Net income to be capitalized .............•..••..... $000.00 
Value determined by capitalization of income ........ tOOO.OO" • 
'The amount is predicated on the compound interest, equal yearly in-
stallments, and declining income assumptions of the Inwood Coefficient. 
(See American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, The Appraisal of 
Beal Estate, Appendi.%, Table III.) 
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cases (216 Cal. 474, 478-482; 216 Cal. 468, 472-473) requiring 
the assessing authorities to deduct the present lessee's charges 
to rent and amortization from expected gross income when 
valuing possessory interests by an analysis of anticipated 
ear.ning power are therefore disapproved.10 
[28] It is contended that the value of the leaseholds, when 
no deduction from income is made for amortization and rent, 
will approach the estimated fee values of the land and im- . 
provements. Since it is conceivable that the" full cash value" 
of a long-term possessory interest may approach the value· 
of the fee, near equality between the two estimated values 
would not of itself demonstrate invalidity in the valuation 
of either one. [29] Nor does near equality of the leasehold 
values to those of the fee constitute a violation of the im-
munity of the federal government from taxation by the states. 
Since the tax is imposed solely on the privately owned pos-
sessory interest of the lessee. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 201, 104, 
107), and under the terms of the contract between the federal 
government and the lessee will be paid entirely by the lessee 
(see also 12 U.S.O.A. § 1748f), neither its legal nor economi<! 
incidence falls on the federal government. (See Wilson v. 
Cook, 327 U.S. 474. 483 f66 8. Ct. 663, 90 L.Ed. 793) ; S.R.A. 
Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 569 [66 8.Ct. 749. 90 L.Ed. 
851] ; Oklahoma Tax Com. v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 364 
[69 8.0t. 561, 93 L.Ed. 721]; Alabama v. King & Boozer, 
314 U.S. 1, 9-14 [62 8.Ct. 43, 86 L.Ed. 3, 140 A.L.R 615] ; 
cf. Society for Savings in Cleveland v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 143 
f75 S.Ct. 607, 610, 99 L.Ed. 950].) 
[30] In determining the value of the leasehold, the assessor 
imputed an income of 6 per cent and taxes of 2 per cent to 
an amount somewhat less than the estimated fee value of the 
land and improvements, deducted the $100 rent paid to the 
government therefrom. and capitalized the difference at 8 per 
cent. This method is erroneous in several respects. First. 
the deduction from imputed income of the $100 rent paid to 
the government substitutes valuation according to the profit. 
ableness of the property to its present owner for the statutory 
lOIn Hammond Lbr. Co. v. County of Los Angetes, 104 Cal.App. 235 
1'285 P. 8961, the District Court of Appeal, in affirming a judgment 
denying recovery of taxes on a possessory interest, explained a method 
of valuation that deducted the lessee's rent from imputed gross income 
and that was presented in evidence to the county board of supervisors 
by the assessing authorities. (104 Cal.App. at p. 244.) That method 
did not control the decision of the court in the Hammond case (sce 
especially 104 Cal.App. at p. 246), and it should not be inferred that it 
now controls assessing authorities. 
) 
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standard of "full cash value." As pointed out above, the 
price that a leasehold would command on an open market 
under conditions in which q.either buyer nor seller could takt> 
advantage of the exigencies of the other is based on expected 
future net income from the leasehold without regard to rent 
paid by the present lessee. Second, no adequate distinction is 
made between imputed gross income and imputed net income. 
An imputed gross income would have to be sufficiently large 
to allow for deduction of anticipated necessary expenses in-
cident to operating and maintaining the project, but no de-
duction for these items, either actual or imputed. is made. 
Imputed net income would equal the minimum reasonable 
return on the investment, but the assessor's method deducts 
the $100 rent to be paid the government, and thereby re-
duces imputed income to a rate of return less than the rate 
of capitalization. 
[81] The value of the leaseholds involved in the present 
case can be estimated more accurately by capitalizing ex-
pected future actual net income instead of an imputed income. 
According to the imputed income analysis used by the as-
sessor, the value of the leaseholds was deemed to be equal to 
the present value of an income imputed to the "base value" 
of the leaseholds, the "base value" being equal to the esti-
mated value of the fee less a deduction for "burdens and 
restrictions of the lease." The initial step in the computa-
tion, an estimation of the fee value of the land and improve-
ments "by the same methods and approaches to value that 
[are used in assessing] all other taxable land in the county. 
similarly situated and of a similar nature," necessitates an 
assumption that land and improvements located in a military 
installation and devoted solely to housing designated persons 
at rents regulated by the government can be said to be 
., similarly situated and of a similar nature" to privately 
owned lands and improvements in the county, even thougb 
great differences exist in geographic location, expected sta-
bility of income, and the range of uses for which the properties 
are available. The second step in the assessor's computation 
was to deduct a "restriction percentage for limitations on the 
use prescribed by the lease, " tbe amount" depending upon the 
burdens and restrictions of the lease," but there is no indi-
cation either that the percentage deducted is an adequate or 
proper measure of such limitations, or that the lease in fact 
imposee. any burdens on the fee, for it is doubtful that the 
land would promise the substantial income that it now does 
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were it not for the assurance of continued occupancy by 
military personnel provided by the lease. (See Meade Heights, 
[nc. v. State Tax Com. of Md., 202 Mo. 20, 31 [95 A.2d 280].) 
After deducting an allowance for limitations, the assessor 
imyuted an income of6 per cent to the remainder, but it is 
not at all clear that actual anticipated income less expenses 
will approximate such imputed income. Moreover, to obtain 
the present value of the imputed income, the assessor capital-
ized the income at a rate of 8 per cent. The capitalization 
rate is supposed to reflect risk and interest attributable to 
the particular investment to which it is applied (see 1 Bon-
bright, The Valuation of Property, pp. 259-264), but the as-
sessor's rate appears to measure, not the risk and interest 
attributable to the investment at bar, but that attributable 
to an. income hypothetically imputed to a "base value." In 
summation, the assessor's valuation of the leaseholds is predi-
cated on tlle assumption that a certain percentage of an 
amount somewhat less than the fee value, when capitalized 
at an abstractly reasonable rate, equals the value of the pos-
sessory interest. In some cases this assumption may have 
to be made, and we do not condemn all estimates of value 
based on capitalization of an imputed income. In valuing 
property wherein actual income is derived in large part from 
enterprise activity and cannot be ascribed el!tirely to the use 
of the property, an imputed income analysis may be both 
useful and appropriate. In the present actions, however, 
the income from the possessory interests will be from sub-
rentals and can be ascribed entirely to the possessory estates. 
Moreover, future income can be expected to remain stable, 
for rents are controlled in amount by the Federal Housing 
Administration and the Department of the Navy and oc-
cupancy is assured by the fact that the project is located on 
a military installation that is "deemed to be a permanent part 
of the Military Establishment." (12 U.S.C.A. § 1748b(b) (2).) 
Expected annual expenditures have been estimated by both 
the Federal Housing Administration and the lessees and there-
fore carefully formulated evidence as to anticipated expenses 
is available to the assessing authorities. Under these circum. 
stances, the value of plaintiff's possessory interests can best 
be estimated in terms of actual income rather than imputed 
income. (See Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 185 Cal. 484, 496 
r197 P. 346] ; Alpaugh Irr. Dist. v. (Jounty of Kern, 113 Cal. 
App.2d 286, 293 [248 P.2d 117] ; Birch v. County of Orange, 
59 Cal.App. 133, 138 [210 P. 57]; H. &- W. Pierce, Inc. v. 
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Oounty of Santa Barbara, 40 Cal.App. 302, 306 [180 P. 641J ; 
lVild Goose C. (Jlub v. County of Butte, 60 Cal.App. 339, 341 
[212 P. 711].) 
Although the trial court employed methods of actual 
income analysis both in its findings and in its order of re-
mand, we have concluded that both of the court's methods 
are improper for estimating the "full cash value" of posses-
sory estates. [32] In its findings the court deducted annual 
"burdens," including payments of principal and interest on 
the mortgage debts, from annual "benefits," and thereby 
computed a value that was inversely proportional to the 
size of mortgage debt payments. Since deduction of "credits 
secured by mortgage or trust deed" is contrary to section 1 
of article XIII of the California Constitution and to well 
established decisions of this court (Lick v. Austin, 43 Cal. 
590, 594; Eisley v. Mohan, 31 Ca1.2d 637, 643 [192 P.2d 5] ; 
cf. Henne v. Los Angeles County, 129 Cal. 297, 298 [61 P. 
1081] [decided before repeal in 1910 of former section 4 of 
article XIII), the method is erroneous. [33] Moreover, in 
stating that net "burdens" have a present value, the court 
assumed that annual losses expected to be sustained in future 
years have a present value in the same sense as money to be 
received in regular future installments, and it also assumed 
that such present value may be used in valuing possessory in-
terests for purposes of taxation. Although the assumption that 
future losses have a present value could rest on the theory 
that a sum of money invested at present to provide for the 
payment of expected losses might be termed their present 
value, a property valuation computed in the manner illus-
trated by the court's findings and resting on the court's as-
sumptions would in effect alter the property tax from a levy 
on the present value of property to a tax on the net worth of 
the individual taxpayer. [34] Plaintiffs, however, do not rely 
on the method used in the court's findings, but contend that 
the method outlined in the order of remand is controlling. Ac-
cording to this method, the present lessee's anticipated annual 
charges to operating expenses, taxes, rent, and amortization 
of money invested in the leasehold together with interest 
thereon are deducted from anticipated annual gross income. 
The difference, when capitalized and reduced to the "proper" 
ratio of assessment to market values, is deemed the v~lue of 
the possessory interest. The error of this method is that de-
duction of amortization does not conform either to the statu-
tory standard of value or to the accepted principles of capital-
ization heretofore discussed. 
) 
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[35] The proceedings must be remanded to the county 
board of equalization for determination of the value of the pos-
sessory interests and the taxes thereon. (Universal ComoZ. Oil, 
00. v. Byram, 25 Ca1.2d 353, 362-363 [153 P.2d 746].) The 
board shall take evidence on annual anticipated gross income, 
operating and maintenance expenses, the amount required 
to be deposited in the replacement reserve, and the percentage 
that will adquately allow for taxes. Moreover, since the rate 
of capitalization is predicated on the risk, interest, and pro-
visions for replacement of capital relative to the investment 
to which it is applied (see 1 Bonbright, op. cit. supra, pp. 
259-262), the board shall take evidence on these matters and 
ascertain therefrom the proper rate of capitalization. It shall 
deduct annual operating and maintenance expenses and the 
deposit to the replacement reserve from annual gross income, 
and shall capitalize the difference at the rate that it deter-
mines will allow for risk, interest, and taxes. The period of 
capitalization shall be the remaining years of the lease, for 
although the government is authorized to terminate the leases 
at the end of 50 years, the terms of the leases and the statute 
under which they were drawn (see especially 12 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1748b (b) (2» clearly contemplate that the leases will exist 
for their full terms. (Kaiser 00. v. Reid, 30 Ca1.2d 610, 620 
[184 P.2d 879].) 
The judgments and orders are reversed with directions 
to the trial court to remand the proceedings to the county 
board of equalization for action in accord with this opinion. 
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied December 
21, 1955. 
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